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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Background: In the globalized economy many countries struggle with the profit shifting to 
low-tax jurisdictions. The generally accepted legal mechanism for counteracting such practice is 
the arm’s length principle. This principle stipulates that the prices in transactions between related 
parties should reflect the prices that would have been agreed between unrelated companies. 
Accordingly, the tax authorities are entitled to adjust the profits of the controlled enterprise if the 
prices in its transactions with related company do not satisfy the arm’s length principle. In that 
way countries are able to prevent erosion of tax base. Important question when it comes to 
applying this principle is how the burden of proof that this principle was (not) followed should be 
allocated between tax authorities and taxpayers. It appears that this issue will become all the 
more important in the future since The OECD took position that arm’s length principle should be 
applied to dealings between a head office and its permanent establishment as well.1 
 
1.2 The Purpose: In EU Law framework the balanced allocation of taxing powers and 
counteracting tax avoidance are recognized by the European Court of Justice as legitimate aims 
pursued by the Member States. Thus, the Member States are allowed to differentiate between 
cross-border and domestic economic operators if such measures are appropriate and 
proportionate for attaining such aim.2 Accordingly, the main question of this assignment will be to 
investigate how do exercising of the fundamental freedoms stipulated in the TFEU and exercising 
of tax sovereignty of the Member States correlate with each other when it comes to burden of 
proving that the arm’s length principle was (not) followed.  The purpose of this work will be to 
contribute to clarifying the issue of how the burden of proof that arm’s length principle was (not) 
followed in inter-company transactions should be allocated within the EU Law context.  
 
1.3 The Outline: In the second part of this paper the relevant case law of The European Court of 
justice will be analyzed. In the third part, the issue of how these judgments correlate with OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines3  will be dealt with. Double-Tax Treaties of the majority of The EU 
Member States are based on the OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital4. OECD 
Commentary on the Model Convention on Income and on Capital in part that deals with the 
Article 9 of the OECD Model refers to TP Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
                                                          
1
 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (Full Version), July 2010, C(7)-6,7 
2
 Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG Finanzamt Heilbronn [2008], Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007], 
2
 Case C-
337/08 X Holding BV v Staatsecretarisvan Financien [2010] 
 
 
 
3
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, July 2010 
4
 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (Full Version), July 2010, C(9)-1 
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Administrations5. Accordingly, TP Guidelines should be included in this research.  Based on the 
conclusions from the second part and the third part, in the fourth part, an analysis of certain EU 
Member States Transfer Pricing rules in relation to the topic of this work will be made. Since, in 
the course of this research, it was not possible to investigate Transfer Pricing regimes in all EU 
Member States, the analyses will include transfer pricing provisions and court decisions of certain 
Member States that were found in works of doctrine and other secondary sources. These 
provisions will be used as examples to show what kind of transfer pricing regimes breach EU Law. 
In the fifth part, concluding remarks will be made based on the findings from the previous parts. 
 
1.4 Method and Materials: In order to fulfill the purpose of this research the relevant judgments 
of the ECJ will be dealt with in the second part. The judgments will be systematized chronologically 
in order to show what is law as it stands today? In the third part the findings from the second and 
the third part will be contrasted to particular chapters of the TP Guidelines that concern the 
burden of proof. In the fourth part the transfer pricing policies of certain Member States will be 
analyzed from an EU Law perspective. In the fifth part concluding remarks will be made. With 
regard to materials, the judgments of the ECJ, TP Guidelines, doctrinal articles and books will be 
used. In the part of this work that concern national legal provisions of the Member States and 
decisions of national courts secondary sources will be used due to language barriers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (Full Version), July 2010, page 442 
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2. EU Legal Framework 
 
 
 
In this part of the paper the question that will be dealt with is what are the legal requirements to 
which Transfer Pricing rules of the EU Member States should be complied with in EU Law context? 
The cases will be discussed in three subsections: first subsection will deal with the arm’s length 
principle and EU Law; second subsection will deal with the development of EU Law principle of 
prohibition of abuse of law while in the third part certain judgments that set the limits to imposing 
administrative requirements to cross-border economic operators will be considered. 
 
 
2.1 Arm’s length principle and EU Law 
 
When it comes to status of arm’s length principle within the ECJ’s case-law three judgments deserve 
particular attention: Lankhorst-Hohrost case, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Litigation Group and SGI case. 
It should be noted that not all of this cases concern transfer pricing. However, they are relevant for the 
issue of what are EU legal requirements to which transfer pricing regimes of EU Member States has to be 
complied with. 
The first judgment that had far-reaching consequences to transfer pricing provisions of the EU Member 
States is Lankhorst-Hohrost judgment.6 The case concerned a German company that was a subsidiary of 
Dutch company which was itself a subsidiary of another Dutch company. The grand-parent company 
granted a loan to Lankhorst. The loan was followed by letter of support under which grand-parent waived 
repayment if third party creditors made claims against Lankhorst. The Loan enabled Lankhorst to reduce its 
bank borrowing. In corporation tax assessment notices The German tax authorities deemed interest paid to 
grand parent company as a covert distribution of profits and charged 30% tax on that payment. The issue 
brought before the ECJ was whether application of the rules that concern covert distribution of profits only 
for repayments in respect of loan capital which a company limited by shares subject to unlimited taxation 
has obtained from a shareholder not entitled to corporation tax credit breaches EU Law. As regards the 
taxation of interest paid by subsidiary companies to their parent companies in return for loan capital, such 
a restriction introduces a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies according to 
whether or not their parent company has its seat in Germany. In addition from order for reference it was 
apparent that there is no entitlement to corporation tax credit, first for non-residents and, second, for 
corporations governed by German law which are exempt from corporation tax, namely legal persons 
governed by public law and those carrying on business in a specific field or performing tasks which should 
be encouraged. The ECJ held that situation of a company such as the parent company of Lakhorst Hohorst, 
which is carrying on a business for profit and is subject to corporation tax, cannot be validly compared to 
                                                          
6
 Case 324/00 Lankhorst Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt [2002] 
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that of the latter category of corporations. Thus, it was apparent that national provision at issue made a 
distinction between domestic and foreign entities based on nationality. The ECJ did not accept justifications 
of German government based on the need to prevent tax avoidance and to ensure the coherence of the tax 
system. The ECJ concluded that such a provision is contrary to Community law. This decision was received 
critics from scholars. As Kordewener argues, the additional argument that the shareholder concerned will 
in any event be subject to a tax legislation of the State in which it is established is still not very convincing 
even though it has now been repeated several times. As long as the area of direct taxes is not harmonized, 
each Member State is responsible for its own tax system and must therefore also be entitled to protect its 
own tax system and must therefore be entitled to protect its own tax system properly.7 Wattel argues that 
Lankhorst-Hohorst implied having either to give up CFC legislation, thin cap rules, earning striping rules, 
transfer pricing documentation requirements etc. in cross border situations or to apply them in a 
domestic situation as well. Many Member States did the latter because they could not afford to 
give them up in cross-border situations. Without them, tax advisors would have reduced the 
domestic corporation tax base of multinational to naught. Denmark, Germany, Spain and UK 
changed their Thin Cap rules and arm’s length pricing rules so as to also encompass domestic 
group financing and transfer pricing.8 It is clear that decision was incorrect because the ECJ did not 
take into account the need of The EU Member States to exercise its tax sovereignty. 
The ECJ changed its approach in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap group litigation case9.  This case 
concerned a number of claims for restitution and or compensation brought by a group of 
companies against Commissioners of Inland revenue in the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales. Each of the cases involved UK resident companies that were at least 75 % owned directly 
or indirectly, by foreign resident parent companies. Namely the ability of resident companies to 
deduct, for tax purposes, an interest paid on a loan finance granted by direct or indirect parent 
company which is resident in another Member State was denied, where that resident company 
would not have been subject to such restriction if the interest had been paid on a loan finance 
granted by a parent company which was resident in the first Member State. The Court rejected 
arguments that such measure was necessary in order to secure the cohesion of the tax system but 
accepted justification based on the need to fight abusive practices. The ECJ ruled that such 
legislation is contrary to Community law unless: ‘that legislation provides for a consideration of 
objective and verifiable elements which makes it possible to identify the existence of a purely artificial 
arrangement, entered into for tax reasons alone, and allows taxpayers to produce, if appropriate and 
without  being  subject  to  undue administrative  constraints,  evidence as to the commercial  justification  
for  the  transaction  in  question  and,  secondly,  where it  is established that such an arrangement  exists, 
such legislation treats that interest as a  distribution only  in  so  far  as  it  exceeds  what  would have  been  
agreed  upon  at  arm's  length.’10 As Wattel argues, this is much rational and practicable result than 
Lakhorst-Hohorst and it means that the arm’s length test has become part of the Court 
                                                          
7
 Axel Cordewener, Company Taxation, Cross Border Financing and Thin Capitalization in the EU Internal Market: 
Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH, European Taxation April 2003, Journals IBFD page 106 
8
 Ben J.M. Terra, Peter J.  Wattel, European Tax Law, sixth edition (abridged student edition), 2012 Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business, page 382 
9
 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commisionaries of Inland Revenue [2007] 
10
 Case C-524/04, paragraph 92 
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assessment under its rule of reason of whether restrictive tax measures can be justified by 
mandatory requirements of public interest, such as the need to prevent tax avoidance and the 
need to preserve balanced allocation of taxing powers among The Member States. Further, Wattel 
stressed out that the ECJ accepted the arm’s length test as an objective and verifiable test of 
absence of artifice.11 On the other hand, some authors criticize such decision by holding that the 
fact that the country of resident subsidiary may reclassify the interest as dividends, but the non-
resident parent company’s country is not bound to apply such a classification and may continue to 
consider the payment as interest, is not logical and contrary to the objective of a harmonized tax 
system.12 Wattel’s opinion seems more convincing because the direct taxation is not harmonized 
area of EU Law and the fundamental freedoms provisions do not guarantee the neutrality of cross-
border movements. This judgment is important because it allows the Member States to 
differentiate between foreign and domestic economic operators to an extent to which the arm’s 
length principle is applicable. However, it only allowed the application of the arm’s length 
principle as an anti-avoidance measure. Although the ECJ has shown more flexible approach to 
measures that differentiate between domestic and cross-border situations it was still unclear how 
this principle correlates with balanced allocation of taxing power concept that became 
increasingly important after The Marks and Spencer judgment.13 The answer to this question was 
given in the SGI case14 that concerned a case of a Belgian company that was refused a business 
expense for a director remuneration paid to the company established in another Member State on 
the ground that the sums paid were disproportionate and unrelated to the economic benefit of 
the service in question. The question that was brought before the ECJ was whether it is in 
accordance with Community Law to tax a resident company in respect of an unusual or gratuitous 
advantage granted to a company established in an another Member State whereas in identical 
circumstances in respect of an advantage granted to a Belgian company it would not be taxed. The 
ECJ ruled: ‘National legislation which provides for a consideration of objective verifiable elements in order 
to determine whether a transaction represents an artificial arrangement is to be regarded as not going 
beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives relating to the need to maintain balanced allocation of 
the power to tax between the Member States and to prevent tax avoidance where, first, on each occasion 
on which there is a suspicion that transaction goes beyond what the companies concerned would have 
agreed under fully competitive conditions, the taxpayer is given an opportunity without being subject to 
undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may be for 
such transaction. Second, where consideration of such elements leads to the conclusion that the transaction 
in question goes beyond what the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive 
conditions, the corrective tax measure must be confined to the part which would have been agreed if the 
                                                          
11
 Ben J.M. Terra, Peter J.  Wattel, European Tax Law, sixth edition (abridged student edition), 2012 Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business, page 384 
12
 Gracia M Lucena Mozo, Thin Capitalization: An Unanswered Question Following Recent Spanish Thin Amendments, 
European Taxation August 2012, Journals IBFD, page 415 
13
 Case C-446/03 Marks and Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of taxes) *2005] Case C-414/06 Lidl 
Belgium GmbH & Co. KG Finanzamt Heilbronn [2008], Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007], 
13
 Case C-337/08 X Holding BV v 
Staatsecretarisvan Financien [2010] 
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 Case C-311/08 Societe de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v Belgian State [2010] 
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companies did not have relation of interdependence.’ In addition, the ECJ did not accept the argument 
of the Belgian government that applying Convention 90/436/EEC (‘The Arbitration Convention’) 
greatly diminishes the risk of double taxation.15 The ECJ held: ‘an additional administrative and 
financial burden is imposed on the company which has submitted its case to such a procedure. 
Moreover, a procedure aimed at resolution by mutual agreement, followed, if necessary, by an 
arbitration procedure, may extend over several years. During that period, the company in question 
must bear the burden of double taxation. Furthermore, it is apparent, in particular in the light of 
the matters set out at paragraph 29 above, that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is 
applicable in certain situations falling outside the scope of the Convention.’16. Opinions are divided 
in the doctrine when it comes to implications of the SGI judgment. ECJ Task Force of the CFE 
argues that the ECJ contradicts itself because in paragraph 65 the ECJ holds that the measure 
restricting freedom of establishment may be justified if it specifically targets wholly artificial 
arrangements designed to circumvent the legislation of the Member State concerned. While in the 
paragraph 66, the ECJ holds that if such a restriction cannot be justified on the grounds of fighting 
wholly artificial arrangements it can be justified on the grounds of counteracting tax avoidance 
taken together with that of balanced allocation of taxing powers.17 While, Baker infers from these 
two paragraphs that although the ECJ could have been a little bit clearer on this point, it does 
appear that the ECJ is making a difference between combating wholly artificial arrangements and 
combating tax avoidance.18 On the other hand, Wattel argues that a balanced allocation of taxing 
power, the fiscal principle of territoriality, and cohesion of tax system all seem to pivot around the 
same concept of tax base integrity for both States involved (source state and residence state), that 
are both free in the present state of EU Law, to exercise in parallel the taxing power they asserted 
on the basis of source residence, nationality, or territoriality. Obviously, also the prevention of 
abuse pivots around tax base integrity, but as observed, on a smaller area of the same scope, 
namely reduced by one, possibly two limiting conditions: motives and artifice.19 In my view Baker’s 
opinion is wrong because it is hard to accept that the ECJ had an intention to preclude its previous 
case law on abusive practices without giving any new definition of what tax avoidance really is in 
EU Law context (this question was dealt more extensively in section 2.2).This approach would 
cause great uncertainty. Anyway, what is important, this judgment confirmed what was ruled in 
Thin Cap but there is one important difference between the Thin Cap judgment and the subsequent 
SGI judgment. In the Thin Cap the justification based on the coherence of tax system was rejected 
and need to encounter tax avoidance was accepted while in SGI judgment was held that the 
                                                          
15
 Case C-318/10, paragraph 47 
16
 Case C-318/10, paragraph 54 
17
 The ECJ Task Force of the CFE, Opinion Statement of The CFE on the Case Law of the European Court of Justice on 
Transfer Pricing Related to Loans (Decision of 21 January 2010 in Case C-311/08 SGI), European Taxation June 2012, 
page 314, Journals IBFD 
18
 Philip Baker, Transfer Pricing and Community Law: The SGI case, Intertax, Kluwer Law International BV The 
Netherlands, Volume 38, issue 4, page195 
 
19
 Ben J.M. Terra, Peter J.  Wattel, European Tax Law, sixth edition (abridged student edition), 2012 Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business, page 491 
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restrictive measure may be regarded as justified by the objective of prevention of tax avoidance, 
taken together with that of preserving the balanced allocation of taxing powers. As Baker rightly 
argues, this judgment confirms that cross-border transfer pricing provisions may be justified, even 
if they operate only cross-border and even if they have a restrictive effect, provided that they 
secure the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction and they are necessary for combating tax 
avoidance.20 Hilling argues that a joint assessment of the two grounds may serve to justify rules 
not specifically designed to prevent typical evasive transactions but with a broad applicability, 
serving to protect the tax base more generally.21 Accordingly, the ECJ in SGI allowed the Member 
States to restrict cross-border movements on those grounds to an extent to which the arm’s 
length principle is applicable. Thus, the significance of this judgment lies in the fact that the arm’s 
length principle was accepted both as an anti-avoidance measure and as an instrument for 
achieving the balanced allocation of taxing powers between the Member States. With regard to 
burden of proof this judgment gives some indications. Namely, in paragraph 73 the ECJ held: 
‘According to the Belgian Government, the burden of proof as to the existence of an unusual or 
gratuitous advantage within the meaning of the legislation at issue in the main proceeding rests 
with the national tax authorities. It states that the burden of proof as to the existence of an 
unusual or gratuitous advantage within the meaning of the legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings rests with the national tax authorities. It states that when those authorities apply that 
legislation, the taxpayer is given an opportunity to provide evidence of any commercial justification 
that there may have been for the transaction in question. The taxpayer has a month, a period 
which may be extended within which to establish that no unusual or gratuitous advantage is 
involved, having regard to the circumstances in which the transaction was effected. If, however, 
those authorities persist in their intention of using a revised assessment and do not accept the 
taxpayer’s argument, the latter can challenge the assessment and do not accept taxpayer’s 
arguments, the latter can challenge the assessment before the national court. The Belgian 
government adds that where the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is applied, only the 
unusual or gratuitous part of the advantage in question is added back to the profits of the 
company which granted it. In those circumstances, subject to verification to be carried out by the 
referring court as regards the last two points, which concern the interpretation and application of 
Belgian law, it must be concluded in light of the forgoing, that national legislation such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings is proportionate to the set of objectives pursued by it’22. Meussen 
argues that the ECJ held in this case that it is vital that the burden of proof be primarily with the 
tax administration, and that taxpayers must be given the opportunity of counterproof without 
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 Philip Baker, Transfer Pricing and Community Law: The SGI case, Intertax, Kluwer Law International BV The 
Netherlands, Voulume 38, issue 4 page 196 
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 Maria Hilling, Justifications and Proportionality: An analysis of the ECJ’s assessment of National Rules for the 
Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Intertax,  Kluwer Law International BV The Netherlands, 2013Volume 41 Issue 5, page 
301  
22
 Case C-311/08, paragraph 73-75 
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undue administrative constraints subject to judicial review before a national court.23 My opinion is 
that the ECJ was not unambiguous when it comes to allocation of burden of proof that the arm’s 
length principle was not followed. The ECJ gave more precise answer to this issue in SIAT 
judgment24 (this case was dealt with in section 2.2 due to structure followed in this work) 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Development of EU law principle of prohibition of abuse of law 
 
Since it was determined in section 2.1 that the ECJ accepted that the Member States may apply 
transfer pricing rules only in cross-border situations under the condition of proportionality in this 
section, as well in the section 2.3, content of proportionality requirement will be closely 
examined. The first case in which the ECJ dealt extensively with the issue of countering abusive 
practices is Leur-Bloem case25. This case concerned the issue of whether it is an exchange of 
shares within the meaning of Article 2 (d) Council Directive 90/434/EEC only if its effect is to 
merge the business of the acquiring company and that of another company permanently in a 
single unit from a financial and economic point of view. The ECJ held that the laying down the 
general rule automatically excluding certain categories of operations from the tax advantage 
would go further then it is necessary for preventing such tax evasion or tax avoidance and would 
undermine the aim pursued by the Directive. The ECJ referred to the purpose of the Directive as a 
limit to depriving economic operators of the Directive benefits on the grounds of abusive 
practices.26 What is important in this decision is that the ECJ has set out the limits for the Member 
States to counteract tax avoidance. On the one hand, it is not allowed to lay down anti-avoidance 
rules that are generally applicable. On the other hand, when assessing whether the situation is 
abusive the purpose of the provision at issue should be observed. However, this case dealt only 
with the Directive provision. Thus, it remained unclear whether these findings of the Court apply 
also when the primary law is concerned. In that respect the ICI judgment27 is rather important. 
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 Prof. Dr Gerard T.K. Meussen, The SGI case: The ECJ Approves Belgian System of Selective Profit Corrections in 
relation to foreign Group Companies in Relation to Foreign Group Companies, European Taxation June 2010, Journals 
IBFD, page 249 
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 Case C-318/10 Societe d’investment pour l’agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Belgian State *2012+ 
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 Case C-28/95 A.Leur Bloem v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen  Amsterdam 2 [1997] 
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 Case C-28/95, paragraph 44 
27
 Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries and Kenneth Hall Colmer  (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) *1998+ 
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This case concerned a UK holding company that had held shares in company majority of which 
were incorporated in other Member States. The national legislation granted a tax relief subject to 
condition that its activity consists wholly or mainly in holding shares of domestic companies. The 
Company argued that it was discriminated against contrary to Community Law. The issue brought 
before the Court was whether these provision is contrary to freedom of establishment. The UK 
outlined the risk of tax avoidance as a justification which the ECJ did not accept holding that:’ …the 
legislation at issue does not have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, 
set up to circumvent United Kingdom tax legislation, from attracting the tax benefits, but applies 
generally to all situations in which the majority of a group’s subsidiaries are established for 
whatever reason, outside UK.’ However, the establishment of a company outside the United 
Kingdom does not of itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance, since that company will in any event 
be subject to the tax legislation of the State of establishment.28 After this judgment it was clear 
that it is against Community Law for the Member States to impose anti-avoidance measures that 
will be generally applicable. It is important to note that the Court referred to reasons for 
establishing the subsidiary abroad (‘whatever reason’). One could argue that this was a hint of the 
motive test that will be developed later in Halifax29 and Cadbury Schweppes30 judgments.  
The landmark judgment for the development of the principle of prohibition of EU Law is Centros 
ltd judgment.31 This case concerned two Danish citizens who founded a company in UK and 
subsequently tried to set up a branch of that company in Denmark. The registration was refused 
on the grounds that the Company, which does not trade in the UK, was in fact seeking to establish 
in Denmark, not a branch but its principle establishment, by circumventing the national rules 
concerning payment of minimum capital.  The ECJ held it was immaterial that the company was 
formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in the second, where it’s 
main, or indeed entire business is to be conducted. Further, the ECJ held that the question of the 
application of fundamentals freedom provision is different from the question whether or not a 
Member State may adopt measures in order to prevent attempts by certain of its nationals to 
evade domestic legislation by having recourse to the possibilities offered by the Treaty. Finally, the 
ECJ concluded that:’ …it is contrary to Community law for a Member State to refuse to register a branch  
of a company formed in accordance with the law of another member state, in which it has its registered 
office but in which it conducts no business, where the branch is intended to enable the company in question 
to register a branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in the State 
in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading the 
application of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that State, are more restrictive as 
regards the paying of minimum share of capital.’32  As De La Feria argues, this case has helped to 
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delineate the concept of abuse for EU proposes. Further, she argues that the ECJ failed to establish 
definite criteria which situations were abusive, and which were not.33 The Court was clear that 
Member State may impose restrictions on exercise of treaty freedoms. However, they cannot 
deprive economic operators of those rights to that extent. In other words, Member States cannot 
put barricades for economic operators from another Member States in order to protect their 
legitimate interests.  
The ECJ dealt with an issue of abuse test in Emsland-Starke Gmbh case34. This case concerned a 
company that exported goods from Germany to Switzerland and immediately after the release for 
home use in Switzerland the exported goods were transported back to Germany unaltered and by 
the same mean of transport under an external Community transit procedure and were released 
for home use in that Member State on payment of relevant import duties. When German 
authorities determined that the goods were immediately imported back to Germany they sought 
the refunds granted back. The question before the ECJ was whether it is against Community Law 
for the exporter to loose his right to refund in circumstances described above. The ECJ held: ‘A 
finding of an abuse requires, first, the combination of objective circumstances in which despite the 
formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules 
has not been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to 
obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for 
obtaining it.’35 
 
This test was slightly modified in Halifax judgment36.  This case concerned a group of companies 
whose activities where mostly exempt for VAT purposes and consequently it could not deduct 
input VAT.  That group made an aggressive tax planning scheme in order to obtain a right to 
deduct VAT. The ECJ was asked, in this case, to give a judgment on the issue whether the doctrine 
of abuse of rights as developed by the Court operate to disallow the Appellants their claims for 
recovery of  relief for input tax arising from the implementation of relevant transactions. The case 
concerned the applicability of the Directive (67/227/EEC). It is important to outline that the AG in 
his opinion on this case stressed that: ‘An  interpretation  of  the Sixth  Directive (Directive 67/227/EEC) 
according  to  this  principle cannot  but  have  the  most  obvious  consequence  to be expected  in the  
context  of  legal interpretation that  the  right  is  not  in  fact conferred,  contrary  to  the  literal  meaning  
of the  legal  provision.  If  this  interpretation entails  any  kind  of derogation,  it will be  only from  the  text  
of  the  rule,  not  from  the  rule itself,  which  comprises  more  than  its  literal element.’ 37 The ECJ 
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confirmed this reasoning and stressed out the relevance of purposive interpretation for 
determining whether abusive practice is present:  ‘In the view of the foregoing considerations, it would  
appear  that, in the sphere of VAT, an  abusive  practice can be found to exist only if, first, the transactions 
concerned, notwithstanding  formal  application  of the  conditions  laid  down by the relevant provisions of 
the  Sixth  Directive  and  the  national  legislation  transposing  it, result in the  accrual of a tax  advantage  
the  grant of which  would  be contrary to the purpose of those provisions. Second,  it  must  also  be  
apparent  from  a  number  of  objective  factors  that  the essential aim of the transactions  concerned  is to  
obtain  a tax advantage.  As  the Advocate  General  observed,  in point  89 of his  Opinion,  the prohibition  
of abuse is not  relevant  where  the economic  activity  carried  out may  have  some  explanation other  
than  the  mere  attainment  of tax  advantages.’38 Accordingly, subjective element from Emsland-Starke 
was replaced with ‘objective factors’ term. This judgment introduced a rather vague term of ‘essential aim 
of transactions’. Consequently, it was not clear to what extent should a transaction be motivated by 
tax reasons in order to be considered abusive. This lack of clarity was removed in The Cadbury 
Schweppes case39  which concerned a UK company that had two subsidiaries in Ireland and in 
third states and that was subject to a charge of tax on the profits of those subsidiaries because 
they were subjected to lower taxes in Ireland. The Court held that domestic legislation should be 
applied in a way to target only wholly artificial arrangements and that in order to find that such 
arrangement exists there must be in addition to a subjective element  consisting  in  the  intention  
to  obtain  a  tax  advantage,  objective circumstances  showing  that, despite  formal  observance 
of the conditions laid down by Community  law, the objective pursued  by freedom  of 
establishment  has  not  been  achieved. 40 However, the ECJ again introduced subjective element 
into abuse test. As HImenez argues, Thin Cap Group Litigation judgment41 (see part 2.1) brought 
the Cadbury Schweppes doctrine more in line with Halifax.42 Namely, it was held in Thin Cap that if 
a taxpayer provides evidence of ‘commercial justification’ for transactions in question there would 
not be ‘purely artificial arrangement entered into for tax reasons alone’. Consequently, the test 
was again objective since the absence of commercial justification made an arrangement abusive. 
Particularly important is Kofoed case43 that concerned the issue whether the tax authorities may 
react to a possible abuse of rights even though the national legislature has not enacted specific 
measures to transpose Article 11 of Directive 90/434. This Article provides that a Member State 
may refuse to apply or withdraw the benefit of all or any part of the provisions of Titles II, III and 
IV of the directive where it appears that the exchange of shares has tax evasion or tax avoidance 
as its principal objective or as one of its principle objectives. The ECJ held: ‘Thus,  Article  11(1)(a)  of  
Directive  90/434  reflects  the  general  Community  law principle  that  abuse  of  rights  is  prohibited.  
Individuals  must  not  improperly  or fraudulently  take  advantage  of  provisions  of  Community  law.  The  
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application  of Community  legislation  cannot be extended  to cover  abusive practices, that  is to  say, 
transactions  carried  out  not  in  the  context  of  normal  commercial  operations,  but solely  for  the  
purpose  of  wrongfully  obtaining  advantages  provided  for by Community  law’. 44 This case is important 
because the Court for the first time refers to the General Community law principle that abuse of 
rights is prohibited.45 However, this judgment did not say clearly whether there is an obligation 
imposed on the Member State to counteract abusive practices even when the EU Law is not 
involved. This issue was dealt with 3M Italia case46. This case concerned an Italian company that 
was involved in judicial proceedings with the tax authorities. The 3M Italia claimed that the tax 
determined by the tax authorities was too high. On the other hand, the tax authorities claimed 
that 3M Italia was involved in sham transaction. When the case reached the Supreme Court the 
company exercised its right to settlement with the tax authorities by way of which it paid only 5 % 
of the disputed sum. The Italian Supreme Court was also on the position that the 3M Italia was 
involved in sham transactions. Consequently, The Italian Supreme Court referred a question to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling where it asked whether such a provision is incompatible with 
Community Law. What is important, the ECJ held: ‘Finally, in any event, it is clear that no general 
principle exists in European Union law which might entail an obligation of the Member States to combat 
abusive practices in the field of direct taxation and which would preclude the application of a provision such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings where the taxable transaction proceeds from such practices and 
European Union law is not involved.’ The relevance of this judgment lies in the fact that the principle 
of prohibition of EU Law is applied only where the EU Law is concerned. In other words, the 
obligation for The Member States to fight abusive practices in situation where the EU Law is not 
concerned can only be imposed through harmonization measures.  
Particularly significant is recent SIAT judgment47 because in this judgment the ECJ gave guidance 
as to how the burden of proof should be allocated with regard to existence of abusive practices. 
The case concerned the issue of whether a national provision that provided that the payments for 
supplies of goods or services are not to be regarded as deductible business expenses where they 
are made or attributed directly or indirectly to taxpayer resident in another Member State, or to a 
foreign establishment, which, by virtue of the legislation in the country of establishment , is not 
subject there to a tax on income or is subject there, as regards the relevant income, to a tax 
regime which is appreciably more advantageous than the applicable regime in the former Member 
State, unless the taxpayer proves that such payments relate to genuine and proper transactions 
and do not exceed the normal limits, whereas, under the general rule, such payments are to be 
regarded as deductible business expenses If they are necessary for acquiring or retaining taxable 
income and if the taxpayer demonstrates authenticity and amount of those expenses. The ECJ 
rightly observed that: ‘the rule at issue was not delimited with sufficient precision at the outset 
and, in a situation where the service provider is established in a Member State other than The 
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Kingdom of Belgium and is subject there to a tax regime which is more advantageous and whether, 
as a result, the special rule will apply.’ Furthermore, the Court referred to AG’s opinion, where it 
was held that: ‘this special rule requires that Belgian taxpayer to provide as matter of course, proof 
that all the services are genuine and proper and that all related payments are normal, without the 
tax authority being required to produce even prima facie evidence of tax evasion or avoidance’48. 
The disputed legal provision was an anti-avoidance rule by its nature and as such it could not be 
formulated in such a broad manner (‘appreciably advantageous tax regime’) and shift the burden 
of proof, exclusively, to tax payers without restricting the freedom to provide services to an extent 
that is not proportionate to the aim of countering tax avoidance. This judgment is also significant 
because it confirms that in the anti-avoidance matters the burden of proof lies initially with the tax 
authorities and that anti-avoidance measures may not leave room for arbitrariness of the tax 
authorities.  
From above considered case law scholars draw different conclusions. Zalasinski argues that the 
principle of prohibition of abuse of EU Law continue to exist in three different forms: as a principle 
of interpretation by which the ECJ determines the legitimate scope of subjective rights derived 
from EU Law, as principle stemming from legislative acts of the council and as a principle 
stemming from the rule of reason in applying fundamental freedoms non discrimination/non 
restriction test which is inspired by the criteria determined for the abuse of the freedoms.49 On 
the other hand, Himenez argues that the evolution of the ECJ’s case law following Cadbury 
Schweppes and Halifax appears to point in the direction that the principle of interdiction of abuse 
of EU Law is uniformly applied and understood in tax cases, with regard to its structural elements 
and content, no matter whether they refer to EU Treaty freedoms or secondary EU Law.50  The 
latter opinion sounds more convincing.  My view is that although the ECJ uses different 
expressions and formulations in its case law that concerns abusive practices it is apparent that in 
all of them only the arrangements that are deprived of any economic substance are targeted.  
Accordingly, it can be inferred from the above discussed case law of the ECJ that there is a legal 
basis for Member States to encounter abusive practices. More specifically, when it comes to the 
area of direct taxation, the Member States are allowed to introduce measures that will be applied 
to cross-border transactions and not to internal situations as well. However, such measures should 
be appropriate and proportionate to the aim pursued. They should target wholly artificial 
arrangements sole purpose of which is to obtain a tax advantage. Furthermore such measures 
may not introduce general presumption of tax avoidance (Cadbury Schweppes and ICI judgments). 
In addition, it can be inferred from SIAT that when it comes to rejecting tax advantages on the 
grounds of abusive practices the initial burden of proof is on the tax authorities (‘they should 
produce prima facie evidence’). 
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2.3 Administrative requirements 
In EU Legal context 
 
The first important case that deals with an issue of an extent to which administrative 
requirements could be applied is Futura judgment51.This case concerned a Luxembourg branch of 
a French company which was denied a right to carry forward losses on the ground that its 
accounts relating to the activities carried in the Luxembourg were not kept and held in accordance 
with the Luxembourg relevant rules. The ECJ precluded such legislation but ruled that the Member 
State concerned may require: ’that that the non-resident taxpayer demonstrate clearly and 
precisely that the amount of loses which he claims to have incurred corresponds, under its 
domestic rules governing the calculation of income and losses which were applicable in the 
financial years concerned, to the amount of the losses actually incurred in that State by the 
taxpayer.’52 Even though this case did not concern transfer pricing issue this judgment appears to 
be applicable to transfer pricing matters as well. This judgment appears to be striking a right 
balance between the need to ensure fiscal supervision and hinder cross-border movements to 
least extent possible. The ECJ gave further guidance in respect of the fiscal supervision 
requirements in Meilicke judgment.53 This case concerned the issue of what evidence can the 
Member States require from residents that have shares in other Member States in order to 
approve them tax deduction for underlying tax paid on corporate income from which dividends 
were paid to them. The ECJ held that: As regards the burden of proof and degree of detail which 
the evidence required must meet in order to benefit from a tax credit in respect of dividends paid 
by a capital company established in another Member State, it must be borne in mind that the tax 
authorities of a Member State are entitled to require the taxpayer to provide such proof as they 
may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions for a tax advantage provided 
for in the legislation at issue have been met and, consequently, whether or not to grant that 
advantage. Such an assessment must not be conducted too formalistically, so that the provision of 
documentary evidence which lacks the degree of detail and is not presented in the form of 
corporation tax certificate provided for by the Member State of taxation of a shareholder having 
received dividends from a capital company established in another Member State of taxation but 
which enables the tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to ascertain, clearly and 
precisely, whether the conditions for obtaining a tax advantage provided for in the legislation at 
issue have been met, must be considered by those authorities to be equivalent to the production of 
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the above-mentioned certificate.54 It can be argued that the Futura requirements are watered 
down by the ECJ in this judgment by obliging the Member States to accept documentary evidence 
even though it ‘lacks a degree of details’. 
This line of reasoning was confirmed, in Acorr SA rulling55. This judgment concerned a French 
company that received dividends from its subsidiaries established in other Member States and 
redistributed those dividends and which was deprived of the tax benefit that would be given in a 
domestic situation. The question that was brought before the ECJ (among others that are not that 
relevant for the topic of this work) was whether the principle of effectiveness and equivalence 
preclude that the reimbursement for a lack of such benefits be subject to condition that the 
taxpayer produces evidence of the tax paid abroad. The Court held:  ‘As regards compliance with 
the principle of effectiveness, it should be noted, first, that the evidence required should enable the 
tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to ascertain, clearly and precisely, whether the 
conditions for obtaining a tax advantage are met, but it does not need to take any particular form 
and the assessment must not be conducted too formalistically.’56 What can be inferred from these 
two judgments is that the need for fiscal supervision has been consistently recognized by the ECJ.  
Accordingly, in transfer pricing matters, the Member States are allowed to allocate the burden of 
proof on the tax payer that his transactions with related party established abroad satisfy arm’s 
length principle.  
 
 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks about the EU Law framework to which transfer pricing 
regimes of the Member States should be accorded with 
 
From above made considerations the legal landscape to which Transfer Pricing regimes of the 
Member States should be complied with can be summarized as follows:  
- Counteracting tax avoidance is a legitimate aim recognized by the ECJ. In addition, when applying 
anti-avoidance measures that are restrictive, from an EU Law perspective, tax authorities should 
bear initial burden of proof (SIAT57) 
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- Transfer Pricing rules are accepted as rules that will be applied only to cross-border situations. 
However, those rules have to satisfy the proportionality test. In other words they should restrict 
cross-border trade to less extent possible (Thin Cap58 and SGI59) 
- Need for fiscal supervision on the side of the Member State is recognized within EU Law. 
However, flexible approach is required. (Futura60, Meiclicke Accor61) 
 
3. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the EU Law context 
 
 
Since the tax authorities of many tax authorities of European countries use TP Guidelines to 
transfer pricing cases, it would be appropriate to examine how do provisions of Transfer Pricing 
guidelines, that concern burden of proof, fit in the EU Law context?  
The part of the TP Guidelines that concern burden of proof is very general. Virtually, it was held 
there that Member States of the OECD have different rules regarding the burden of proof but that 
in most of them tax authorities carry the burden of proof both during a tax audit and in court 
proceedings. It was also stated that neither taxpayers nor tax authorities should abuse burden of 
proof.62 However, there are other provisions of the TP Guidelines that give an indication how the 
burden of proof should be allocated in specific situations. Namely, in Chapter I was held that there 
are two situations were it could be suitable for tax authorities to reject transactions between 
related parties or give a transaction another character. Those are situations where the economic 
substance of transaction is different from its form or the form and substance of transaction are 
the same but transaction as a whole diverges from what would be agreed upon the arm’s length 
to an extent that is impossible to make appropriate adjustments. It was stressed out in the 
Guidelines that in both set of circumstances described above that character of the transactions 
may derive from the relationship between the parties rather than be determined by normal 
commercial conditions and may have been structured by the taxpayer to avoid or minimize tax. It 
was also stressed out that the tax authorities may reject or re-characterize transactions between 
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related parties where there is a good reason to doubt the economic substance of a particular 
transactions63. Thus, these measures are directed towards tax avoidance. 
It can be inferred that these measures do not breach EU Law because they are targeting wholly 
artificial arrangements which is in accordance with the ECJ rulings in Test Claimants in The Thin 
Cap Group Litigation64, SGI65 and Cadbury Schweppes66. Furthermore, the fact that tax authorities 
should have a ‘good reason to doubt the economic substance’ implies that they should have initial 
burden of proof when applying this measure, which is in accordance with SIAT67. Namely, in SIAT 
the ECJ held that tax authorities should provide prima facie evidence of avoidance or abuse in 
order to reject deduction for expenses incurred.68 The same logic underpins this recommendation 
given in the Guidelines.  That logic implies that in order for tax authorities to get authorization to 
apply harsh measures towards taxpayers, they should provide satisfactory evidence that indicates 
a lack of economic substance. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4. Analysis of Transfer pricing legislation and court decisions in 
certain EU Member States from an EU Law aspect 
 
This part will be divided in two sections. The first will deal with Transfer Pricing provisions of 
certain Member States that concern administrative requirements and that where disputed in the 
doctrine from an EU Law aspect.  
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The second will deal with an issue of what transfer pricing adjustments and under which 
conditions can tax authorities in the EU make and stay compatible with Community Law 
requirements.  
 
 
 
4.1 Transfer pricing compliance provisions:  How far can the Member States from 
EU Law perspective? 
 
Transfer pricing compliance measures are necessary for the Member States of the EU in order to 
exercise their taxing rights. However, they should satisfy the proportionality requirements as given 
in the judgments of the ECJ.  
4.1.1. Documentation requirements in Spanish transfer pricing legislation 
In Spain (business entities must prepare and maintain certain prescribed documentation when they enter 
into transactions with related parties. These requirements also apply to transactions entered into with 
entities located in tax havens, even if these are not related parties. Documentation regarding the group 
to which the taxpayer belongs, which can be prepared and maintained by the dominant company, 
setting out: 1) a general description of the group; 2) the associated enterprises engaged in 
controlled transactions; 3) a general description of the nature, amounts and flows of the 
controlled transactions; 4) a general description of functions performed and risk assumed by the 
group's entities; 5) an inventory of intangible property; 6) a description of the group's transfer 
pricing policy, including the transfer pricing method; 7) an inventory of cost sharing and service 
agreements; 8) information about relevant APA’s or MAP’s; and 9) the group's annual report. 
Qualifying small and medium-sized companies need not to prepare and maintain this 
documentation. Taxpayer-specific documentation, setting out: 1) taxpayer data and information 
on the related entities, as well as a detailed description of the nature, characteristics and amounts 
of the transactions performed; 2) a comparability analysis; 3) a description of the elected 
valuation method; 4) the allocation criteria for services rendered jointly and for sharing costs 
agreements; and 5) any other relevant information for determining the valuation of related party 
transactions. Qualifying small and medium-sized companies must prepare and maintain this 
documentation.69 
Himenez find the requirement that only the Master file that contains all the information required 
under Spanish legislation is admitted and permits the taxpayer to avoid sanctions goes beyond 
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what is necessary and probably falls short of meeting EU Law requirements as defined in Futura, 
Thin Cap and SGI. 70  
Firstly, these requirements do not go beyond what was stated in The Code of conduct on transfer 
pricing documentation for associated enterprises:  
EU TPD should contain enough details to allow the tax administration to make a risk assessment for case 
selection purposes or at the beginning of tax audit, ask relevant and precise questions regarding MNE’s 
transfer pricing and assess the transfer prices of the inter company transactions.71 
Secondly, it is hard to agree with Himenez because the Spanish transfer pricing provisions are 
formulated broadly enough to make it possible for Spanish tax authorities to interpret them in the 
light of EU Law requirements as given in Thin Cap72 and SGI73 but also in the light of the Meilicke74 
and Accor ruling75.  
 
4.1.2. Special procedure for transfer pricing cases in Greek transfer pricing legislation 
 
In July 2009, Greece adopted new legislation on transfer prices.  The procedural rule was imposed 
which stipulates that if an infringement of the arm’s length principle is envisaged by an audit, the 
issue is referred to a special audit committee which may take a reasoned decision on the 
adjustment taking into account the internationally accepted OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing. 
The adjustment is subject to a fine equal to 10 %.76 
Mavraganis criticizes the provision. He outlines that this procedure seldom favors an enterprise 
and it is extremely bureaucratic and formalistic.77 If this is true, such a procedure is not compatible 
with EU Law, since it was held in Accor judgment that tax assessment may not be conducted too 
formalistically.78 The State organs during a tax audit and in possible subsequent court dispute 
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should take into account these considerations because EU law is breached not only when national 
legislation in itself is contrary to it but also when domestic provisions are applied in a way that is 
contrary to Community Law. In other words, conduct of The EU Member States administration and 
courts are relevant as well.  If these requirements are fulfilled, then it would not be contrary to 
Community law to have procedure that would be conducted only in a case of cross-border groups 
of companies as long the taxpayer has an opportunity to demonstrate that transactions he was 
involved in were arm’s length.   
 
4.2 Transfer Pricing Adjustments and EU Law 
 
4.2.1 National provisions and Supreme Court decisions of certain Member States  
 
Some Member States give broad authorization to their tax authorities when it comes to transfer 
pricing adjustments. Accordingly, in this section legislative provisions and court judgments of 
certain Member States that concern this issue will be contrasted with EU Law requirements 
analyzed in part 2.  
In Denmark the Section 2(1) of the Tax Assessment Act stipulates that the tax authorities can make 
transfer pricing adjustment of controlled transactions on the basis of the arm’s length principle. In 
its recent judgment, from 2 February 2012, the Danish Supreme Court adopted following 
interpretation of the Section 2(1) of the Tax Assessment Act: ‘The authority to make an 
adjustment covers all economic elements and other terms of relevance for taxation purposes 
including, for example, also due date, recognition of interest   and capital losses and the legal 
qualification of transaction.’79  Further, The Greek legislation stipulates that in the case of domestic 
enterprises the arm’s length principle applies on the basis of consideration for the sale of goods or 
supply of services whereas in the case of international groups the arm’s length principle is applied 
on the basis of the economic terms of the cross-border sale of goods or supply of services.80 In 
Germany arm’s length principle applies to contractual arrangements in addition to prices. 81 
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As it was argued by CFE Fiscal Committee, if tax administrations are free to first reinvent the 
controlled transaction, the essential nature of the arm’s length principle is subverted. The 
threshold for doing so is correctly and accurately stated in the existing guidelines, i.e. where the 
normal transfer pricing rules cannot properly be applied. The proposed watering down of this 
principle not only subverts the arm’s length principle but also undermines certainty and threatens 
the rule of law as it heightens the risk of taxation by administrative discretion and arbitrary 
application. It also increases the risks of double taxation requiring recourse to the mutual 
agreements procedure82.As it was concluded in section 2.1, transfer pricing rules of the EU 
Member States, if applied only cross-border, impose restrictions to cross-border movements of 
economic operators and, accordingly, should satisfy the proportionality test in order to be 
compatible with Community Law. Consequently, these approach breaches Community Law on 
several grounds: 
Firstly, the re-characterization of transactions (the rejection of transactions as well) is an anti-
avoidance measure. It applies when the form of a transaction differs from its substance. In such 
situation tax authorities should be allowed to re-characterize transactions between related parties 
in order to determine properly what would be agreed between related parties. If this 
authorization is given to the tax authorities unconditionally, then a general presumption of 
artificiality is introduced which is against The Community law as judged by the ECJ. It is settled 
case-law that anti-avoidance measures should specifically target only wholly artificial 
arrangements.83 
Secondly, it was held in SIAT that when tax avoidance is the matter the burden of proof initially 
lies with the tax authorities. More precisely they should show the ‘prima facie evidence’ of tax 
evasion or avoidance. 84 . 
Thirdly, with regard to the allocation of burden of proof, such approach could be used as an 
excuse for the tax authorities not to try to find comparable transactions to those of the related 
parties observed (which can be really problematic in some situations, for instance with intellectual 
property rights) when the burden of proof is allocated to them (initially or subsequently when 
appropriate adjustment to the profits of a company are necessary) and try to make appropriate 
adjustments but to reject or re-characterize transaction made between related parties from the 
start as artificial and in that way transfer the burden of proof to the taxpayer in a subsequent 
procedure. Consequently, the taxpayers will be subject to undue administrative constraints85, 
which is contrary to Community Law.  
Finally, such broad authorization on the side of tax authorities is contrary to the TP Guidelines as 
well (see part 3). Since many EU countries apply those guidelines in the course of a tax audit, such 
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difference in approach could lead to double taxation. In that regard, the ECJ ruled that possibility 
to avoid double taxation, given to the EU companies under the Arbitration Convention, does not 
neutralize breach of Community Law by a Member State.86 
Overall, to give the tax authorities unconditional authorization to adjust the profits of an 
enterprise is unacceptable at this stage of development of EU Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Examples of good and bad practice from EU Law perspective 
 
In this subsection two cases from judicial practices of two different Member States will be used in 
order to show more clearly what conduct of pursuing arm’s length principle by the tax authorities 
is compatible with EU Law and what is not. Facts of this case and decision brought by the Dutch 
Court were found in an article of Jaap Reyenvald and Mark Bonekamp87 and will be summarized in 
the next paragraph:  
The case concerned a group of companies that where providing leisure services and with it offered 
its clients the possibility to insure themselves in the case of cancelation of travel (further: group 
A). At one moment group A lost the possibility to sell insurance policies in Netherlands since it was 
not capable to fulfill requirements under the Dutch civil Law.  After that, this group A entered into 
arrangement with unrelated group of insurance companies (further: group B) that provided the 
insurance services instead of it. The Dutch subsidiary of Group A provided intermediary services 
consisting of the selling insurance policies, collecting the insurance premiums, settling insurance 
claims, handling damage payments and drafting three monthly financial statements all on behalf 
of Group B. The B group company that was selling insurance policies was reinsured by related 
company while that company was reinsured with the company that belonged to A Group and that 
was established in Ireland. Irish affiliate of the A group did not have any employees and 
management of that company was conducted by another Irish company that was part of the B 
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Group. For the Services provided to B Group Dutch affiliate of Group A was entitled to 
remuneration 3.5 % of the insurance premiums due in calendar year concerned. Under the same 
arrangement A Group was entitled to 5% of insurance premiums due per year. Every three months 
80 % of insurance premiums were transferred to Dutch subsidiary of B group which were 
subsequently transferred to Irish subsidiary of group A as remuneration for reinsuring the risk of B 
group. When the Dutch tax authorities assessed the Dutch subsidiary of Group A they attributed 
profit earned by the Irish subsidiary to it. Furthermore, the tax authorities held that Irish 
subsidiary lacks essential characteristics of an insurance company. The reasoning of the Dutch tax 
authorities was confirmed by the District Court of Hague which held that the risk to which the Irish 
subsidiary of Group A was exposed to was negligible. Furthermore, the Court held that the Irish 
subsidiary of group A preformed only administrative activities and that compensation to this 
subsidiary should only be given for these services. The negligible insurance risk did not require 
additional remuneration. The taxpayer appealed to the upper Court. 88 
This decision should be rejected on the grounds of EU Law. Firstly, the Irish company did actually 
bore the insurance risk. Accordingly, there was a commercial justification for the transactions in 
question (the Irish company was not just a ‘letterbox company’) within the meaning of Cadbury 
Schweppes89, Thin Cap90 and SGI91. Thus, group A was not involved in wholly artificial 
arrangement. Secondly, the tax authorities should have first shown that there is a reasonable 
doubt of tax avoidance before the existence of insurance transactions was rejected. Accordingly, 
SIAT requirements92 were breached because the transaction between related parties was re-
characterized as transactions that increase the tax base of a taxpayer without showing satisfactory 
evidence of tax avoidance. 
On the other hand, when it comes to burden of proof during an tax audit, it appears that French 
Council d’ Etat has approach that is in line with Community Law. The decision at issue is The 
French Counseil d’Etat judgment from 12 March 2010 Case number: 307235. The secondary 
source for this decision was a doctrinal article from Pierre-Yves Bourtourault and Marc Bernard93. The 
facts will be summarized in the next paragraph:  
A Luxembourgian company was involved in business of selling perfumes, cosmetic and fashion 
products the French subsidiary of that company was held to provide marketing services. The 
French Tax Authorities held that all of the substantive activity was in fact preformed from France. 
Namely, they noted that the Luxembourgian company had only one part time employee in 
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Luxembourg during the audited period. Further, the premises of the French subsidiary were 
searched and the tax authorities seized various documents produced on the letterhead of the 
Luxembourgian company: invoices, business mails, customer account extracts, goods delivery and 
bank statements for accounts in France. The French company had also pretended that it was 
acting as a service provider on account of the Luxembourgian company. However, no such 
agreement had been concluded and no corresponding compensation had been paid or booked. 
Consequently, the tax authorities held that a Luxembourgian company had a permanent 
establishment on the premises of French company. The decision of the tax authorities was 
confirmed by the Couseil D’Etat.94 
Contrary to the Dutch case discussed above the taxpayer did not provide any evidence that the 
setting up a company in Luxembourg was not wholly artificial arrangement and that French 
subsidiary actually provided marketing services (form was not accorded to substance) On the 
other hand, the tax authorities first found evidence of artificiality and, subsequently, rejected that 
marketing services were provided and ruled that Luxembourgian company had a permanent 
establishment on the premises of a French Company . 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
From the considerations made above it can be inferred that, as the EU Law stands today, the 
burden of proof that the arm’s length principle was (not) satisfied may be allocated to taxpayers. 
The EU Member States may impose reasonable compliance measures and make appropriate 
adjustments to the prices of transactions between related parties. These are acceptable measures 
necessary for the Member States to exercise their fiscal sovereignty. However, when it comes to 
proving artificiality element of non arm’s length transaction the tax authorities should produce 
reasonable evidence of artificiality before applying measures that should counteract tax 
avoidance. In other words, tax payers should not initially carry the burden of proof that they were 
not involved in artificial arrangements. On the contrary, taxpayers should produce evidence that 
their transactions with related parties are satisfying the arm’s length standard. On the other hand, 
tax authorities should determine whether there are any elements of artificiality in those 
transactions. If they determine that artificiality is present they can apply anti-avoidance measures, 
such as rejection or re-characterization of transactions and the burden of proof is then allocated 
back on a taxpayer.  However, as it was determined in chapter 4.1 not all EU Member States 
follow this approach. They rather give their tax authorities unconditional authorization to adjust 
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not only profits but also other elements of transactions between related parties. My opinion is 
that such transfer pricing regimes will be eventually disputed before the ECJ (either by 
infringement proceedings or by referring a question for a preliminary ruling) and be precluded as 
incompatible with EU Law. 
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